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While Pemex was the sole player in Mexico’s 
oil and gas industry, gasoline theft seemed 
to be something of a minor problem, a 
localized activity controlled by a few 
gangs. Fuel theft, however, has grown over 
time—partly due to a hands-off approach 
embraced by Mexican authorities for years, 
if not decades—and has reportedly attracted 
the attention of more sophisticated criminal 
organizations seeking to diversify their 
illegal activities.1
 Over the last few years, factors such 
as increased demand for stolen fuels, a 
weak rule of law, and the lack of economic 
opportunities in local communities have 
played a crucial role in reshaping the 
configuration of the now widespread black 
market in stolen fuels. Illegal trade in fuels is 
booming, further incentivizing new entrants 
into this black market. The extent of fuel theft 
is now so great that it is becoming a serious 
financial burden for Pemex and, more broadly, 
may pose a challenge to the implementation 
of policies aimed at the liberalization of the 
gasoline market in Mexico.
A BOURGEONING UNLAWFUL BUSINESS
It has been widely documented that 
the black market in gasoline has grown 
alongside the Mexican government’s 
crackdown on illegal drug cartels. When 
President Felipe Calderón launched his major 
assault on organized crime in late 2006, 
Pemex had identified 213 illegal pipeline taps; 
however, as cartels learned how profitable 
the sale of stolen gasoline could be, the 
number of taps climbed sharply (Figure 1). 
According to Pemex’s latest annual report,2 
the number of illegal pipeline taps grew to 
6,873 in 2016, a 32-fold increase over the 
span of a decade.
 Clearly, the end of the Calderón 
administration and the advent of the Peña 
Nieto administration in 2012 did nothing to 
slow the crisis. On the contrary, fuel theft has 
flourished during the presidency of Enrique 
Peña Nieto. Federal and state authorities 
appear to be overwhelmed by the scale of 
the problem and the capabilities of organized 
criminals, and the Mexican state appears too 
weak to address the issue head-on.
 The poor, and even worsening, 
economic condition of the communities 
where pipeline tapping occurs compounds 
the problem. The income that this illegal 
activity generates for the average citizen 
can be far more appealing than wages 
earned from toiling at a very low-paying 
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SOURCE  El Economista, using information from Pemex.
FIGURE 1 — ILLEGAL PIPELINE TAPS IN MEXICO3 (2006–2016)4 
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billion (approximately US$982 million) in 
2009 to Mex$30.8 billion (approximately 
US$1.7 billion) in 2016.7
 Failing to address this problem in the 
midst of a comprehensive energy reform 
marking the end of Pemex’s monopoly on 
oil and gas exemplifies the weakness of the 
country’s rule of law. It is, in fact, worth 
considering whether the illegal tapping of 
fuel pipelines is hampering the country’s 
prospects of attracting investment in 
gasoline retailing and other areas of the 
energy sector. That remains to be seen, 
but it is certain that private players will be 
watching closely to see how the Mexican 
government confronts this issue.
PUEBLA AS THE EPICENTER OF 
GASOLINE THEFT 
Understanding the geography of the 
problem is a first step toward resolving it. 
Fuel pipelines, which originate at Pemex 
facilities located in the eastern state of 
Veracruz, run through the state of Puebla 
in close proximity to the 150D and 132D 
federal highways en route to Mexico City. 
This strategic location is what has caused 
the municipalities located along the 150D 
highway to become the epicenter of the 
gasoline theft industry—an argument 
reinforced by Figure 3, where the 2016 
map illustrates the extent to which fuel 
smuggling has grown in the vicinity of 
Highway 150D8 and, to a lesser extent, along 
Highway 132D in northern Puebla.9
 In line with Figures 1 and 2, the maps 
in Figure 3 demonstrate that gasoline theft 
has sharply increased since 2006, with the 
number of Puebla municipalities involved 
rising from seven in 2006 to 24 in 2016.10 
In 2006, as Calderón began his presidential 
term, Pemex reported nine pipeline taps 
throughout the state of Puebla, a number 
that grew to 110 six years later. Over time, 
however, the problem has become even 
more severe, with the number of taps 
soaring to 815 in 2015 and 1,533 in 2016.11
 Of the 1,533 pipeline taps reported 
in 2016, 1,071—or 70% of the total—were 
located along Highway 150D between 
the border with Veracruz and Puebla’s 
job. It has been documented, for example, 
that looters can make up to US$50,000 
a month, while the salary for a local 
policeman is around US$270 a month. This is 
too astonishing an income gap for people to 
ignore, and it makes this a social problem.5 
Many families now benefit from this income, 
which creates general popular support for 
the activity itself. In fact, it is one of the 
reasons why gangs have substantial backing 
and protection from local populations. 
 Consequently, it is hardly surprising 
that community residents who know where 
the pipelines are and local gangs who 
know how to tap into these pipelines have 
teamed up with well-financed criminal 
organizations to make the business even 
more lucrative, violent, and harmful to the 
profits of Pemex and of the country (Figure 
2). This looting puts the recent energy 
reform at risk, as companies seeking to 
invest in Mexico’s infrastructure may hold 
their projects until they better understand 
how to prevent such damages from 
occurring. Their caution is justified. It is 
estimated that the market value of stolen 
fuel from 2013 to 2016 totaled Mex$97.2 
billion (approximately US$6.4 billion), a 
figure 55% higher than the Mex$62.8 
billion (approximately US$4.9 billion) Pemex 
lost from 2009 to 2012. In other words, 
illicit profits have risen from Mex$13.3 
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SOURCE  Taken from AnimalPolitico.com, using information from Pemex Logistica.
FIGURE 2 — PROFITS AND PRODUCTION LOSSES (2009–2016)6
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state capital12 (more precisely, in the 
municipalities of Tepeaca, Palmar de Bravo, 
Acajete, Quecholac, and Acatzingo). In 
a certain sense, this reveals the degree 
to which the Mexican state has failed to 
address the problem: as geographically 
localized as it is, the government has not 
been able to penetrate these communities 
and prevent pipeline tapping.
 This does not mean that the Mexican 
government has not tried to do anything. In 
Quecholac, the army clashed with smugglers 
on May 3, 2017, in an effort to stop fuel 
theft. However—and as a testament to the 
difficulties the government is having in 
curtailing the problem—it was reported that 
armed gangs and their supporters in the 
various communities attacked the military, 
leading to a confrontation where 10 people 
died (four soldiers and six civilians). The 
clash shows that huachicoleros, as the fuel 
thieves are locally known, are in a position 
to challenge the government and make the 
liberalization of the gasoline market more 
difficult. The Mexican government has 
announced that cracking down on gasoline 
theft will continue and that the military will 
be further engaged. This strategy, however, 
may increase the levels of violence in the 
region and Puebla as a whole,13 and may 
add to the already growing levels of violence 
throughout the country.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the eyes of investors and trading 
partners, the increase in fuel theft in 
Mexico raises serious concerns related to 
the local business environment and the 
ability of Mexican authorities to implement 
effective changes within the energy sector 
and to guarantee investments, especially 
in onshore projects. Confrontation with 
criminal gangs seems to be as certain as 
the government’s inability to prevent the 
thefts. Any public policies addressing this 
issue should take into consideration all three 
issues outlined above: enforcing the law is a 
necessity, but it must be accompanied by a 
strategy to generate better living conditions 
in communities where this problem is 
growing, and any attempt to stop tampering 
with the pipelines has to be accompanied 
with a greater capacity to strengthen the 
rule of law in the country as a whole. If 
not, criminal activities associated with fuel 
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SOURCE  www.gobiernofacil.com, with information from Pemex.
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9. The 132D federal highway runs from 
Tuxpan in the state of Veracruz to Mexico 
City, passing through northern Puebla. 
10. Pemex identified 27 municipalities 
out of 217 as being involved in fuel theft over 
the course of this period, although there 
were only 24 in 2016. 
11. “Robo de combustible en Puebla 2000 
al 2016,” Gobierno Fácil, February 4, 2017, 
http://gobiernofacil.com/herramientas/
robo-de-combustible-en-puebla.
12. Darker colors indicate greater 
numbers of pipeline taps.
13. Patrick J. MacDonnell, “Clashes 
between soldiers and gasoline smugglers 
leave 10 dead in Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, 
May 4, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/
world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-
gas-smugglers-20170504-story.html.
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theft will continue, and armed conflicts 
surrounding the government’s attempt to 
end it may drag on for many years to come.
ENDNOTES
1. Tania L. Montalvo, “Así evoluciono 
el robo de combustible en México hasta 
provocar pérdidas millonarias,” Animal 
Político, February 3, 2017, http://www.
animalpolitico.com/2017/02/robo-
combustible-mexico/.
2. Petroleos Mexicanos, “Reporte Annual 
2016,” https://www.bmv.com.mx/es/
Grupo_BMV/InfoFinanciera/PEMEX-5902.
3. Refers to crude, refined products and 
liquefied petroleum gas. 
4. Luis Carriles, “Pemex litiga para evitar 
pago de daños,” El Economista, March 
14, 2017, http://eleconomista.com.mx/
industrias/2017/03/14/pemex-litiga-evitar-
pago-danos.
5. Pablo Ferri, “Antes, como policía, 
ganaba 270 dólares al mes. Ahora, con el 
combustible, puedo sacar hasta 50,000,” 
El País, May 23, 2017, http://internacional.
elpais.com/internacional/2017/05/23/
mexico/1495496778_273384.html. 
6. “Pemex pierde 100 mil mdp por 
robo de combustible y fugas en el sexenio 
de EPN,” Animal Político, February 2, 2017, 
http://www.animalpolitico.com/2017/02/
robo-combustible-ductos-pemex-
gobierno-pena/. 
7. In this paragraph, figures expressed 
in US dollars take into account the average 
exchange rate of the dollar against the 
peso for every year observed in the 
aforementioned period, according to 
the historical exchange rate series from 
Mexico’s Central Bank. Data retrieved from 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/
consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do?sector
=6&idCuadro=CF373&accion=consultarCuad
ro&locale=es.
8. The 150D highway runs from the 
state of Veracruz to Mexico City, coinciding 
with the location of the municipalities 
highlighted on the 2016 map. 
See more policy briefs at:
www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs
This publication was written by a 
researcher (or researchers) who 
participated in a Baker Institute project. 
Wherever feasible, this research is 
reviewed by outside experts before it is 
released. However, the views expressed 
herein are those of the individual 
author(s), and do not necessarily 
represent the views of Rice University’s 
Baker Institute for Public Policy.
© 2017 Rice University’s Baker Institute 
for Public Policy 
This material may be quoted or 
reproduced without prior permission, 
provided appropriate credit is given to 
the author and Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy.
Cite as:
Duhalt, Adrian. 2017. Looting Fuel 
Pipelines in Mexico. Issue brief no. 
06.23.17. Rice University’s Baker Institute 
for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.
